











Cross Market Effects of stocks Short-Selling 
Restrictions: Evidence from the September 
2008 Natural Experiment 
 
Cristina Danciulescu 
Indiana University  
 
November 13 2009 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597741. 
 
The Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research resides in the Department of Economics 
at Indiana University Bloomington.  CAEPR can be found on the Internet at: 
http://www.indiana.edu/~caepr. CAEPR can be reached via email at caepr@indiana.edu or 
via phone at 812-855-4050. 
 
©2008 by NAME. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may 
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to 
the source. Cross market eects of stocks short-selling




This draft, November 13th, 2009
Abstract
Using intraday data, this paper investigates empirically the joint stock and corporate bond
markets responses to the September 2008 stocks short sell ban. The study intends to exploit the
natural experiment in order to asses the impact of the stock market short sale restrictions (stock
market liquidity shock) on corporate bond market variables during the nancial crisis period.
The short sell ban was one of the levers that regulators pulled in order to manage the nancial
crisis. The economic question is whether this lever worked or should have been pulled given
the complexity of nancial market linkages and news dissemination. Recent nancial events sug-
gested that, when market conditions are severe, liquidity can rapidly decline or even disappear.
Liquidity shocks are the potential channel through which asset prices are inuenced by liquidity.
However, the standard theoretical equilibrium asset pricing models do not consider trading and
thus ignore the time and cost of transforming cash into nancial assets and viceversa hence ignor-
ing the impact of the liquidity shocks. Therefore, investigating liquidity shocks empirically, their
transmission across markets is of high interest especially during times of high turbulence as we
recently witnessed. We use vector autoregression (VAR) approach to model stock and corporate
bond returns, volatilities and transaction costs simultaneously, obtaining an econometric reduced
form that incorporates causal and feedback eects among the two markets variables. Using VAR
tools, we found that shocks in stock market (short sell ban) had a signicant negative impact on
corporate bond market variables during the time under investigation.
Keywords and Phrases: Corporate bonds, Stocks, Short-sale restrictions, Cross markets eects
JEL classication code: C12, C32, G01, G18.
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11 Introduction
What news or events move corporate bond market liquidity and prices? The answer to this question is
of high interest to anyone monitoring the nancial markets from traders and fund managers exploring
buying and selling opportunities from price uctuations, to central bankers using asset prices to
manage investors' expectations.
Financial markets are driven by news and information. The standard asset pricing theory assumes
that all market participants possess the same information. However, in reality dierent traders hold
dierent information. Some traders might know more than others about the same event or they
might hold information related to dierent events. Even if all the traders hear the same news in the
form of a public announcement, they still might interpret it dierently. Therefore, nancial markets
cannot be well understood unless one also examines the asymmetries in the information dispersion
and assimilation process.
Depending on their information set, traders buy or sell assets. Informed agents' trading activities
are motivated by private information about the real value of the assets not known to the other market
participants. They act strategically in the attempt to make a prot out of this private information.
On the other hand, traders who do not receive information are still conscious of the fact that the
actions of the informed traders are driven by their information set and they try to infer the other
traders' information. In consequence, the uninformed (liquidity) agents face the learning problem of
inferring the true value of the traded assets by observing the behavior of the other traders. The usual
way they learn is by looking at the market information such as prices, volumes and volatilities. In
addition to a particular market information, comes all the available public information including other
markets' variables and news released in those markets.
On September 18th 2008, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced
an Emergency Order restricting short sales in the stock market for 900 nancial rms that included
banks, insurance and securities rms, companies belonging to the highly leveraged nancial sector.3
4 Our empirical investigation of the September 2008 stocks short sell ban focuses on the implications
that such announcement and applied restrictions had for the corporate bond market. Does a short
sell ban applied in the stock market have any impact on corporate bond market prices, volatility and
liquidity? What are the potential channels through which a stocks short sell ban could inuence the
3A short sell ban means that traders are no longer allowed to sell a stock that they do not own, known as \shorting"
the stock, even if they are able to locate someone who does and is willing to lend it.
4However SEC issued an exemption to this ban for the registered market makers who were facilitating client orders.
Without this exemption, market makers would not have been able to hedge their exposure and may have forced clients
to pay much higher prices in order to take on the unhedged risk.
2corporate bond market variables? How fast is the new information related to the ban incorporated
into the corporate bonds prices? Do short sell restrictions in the stock market move the pessimist
investors from the stock market into the corporate bond market? What are the cross market eects
of announcing and imposing such restrictions during abnormal periods as for example a nancial
turbulence? Is there any empirical evidence that these two markets are integrated? These are the
main empirical questions that we intend to address in this paper.
In order to motivate our proposal of joint consideration in analysis of both markets, we provide an
intuition that relies on the bond price determination theory. According to this theory, a bond price
equals the present value of all future cash ows from the asset discounted at a certain discount rate.
More formally, the time t price of a n-period bond B equals the discounted sum of all future coupon





[1 + Y (T)]t +
FVt
[1 + Y (T)]T g; (1)
where B(T) is the price of the coupon bond maturing at date T, Ct is the dollar amount of coupon
payments at date t, FVt is the dollar amount of face value at time t, and Y (T) denotes the \yield-to-
maturity" of the coupon bond maturing at date T.
By Fisher decomposition and the Expectation hypothesis we have that the interest rate at time
t on the n period nominal bond, Y n
t , can be decomposed into a real interest rate component and an
average expected ination component
Y n
t = E(RnjIt) + E(njIt); (2)
where Y n
t denotes the n-period nominal yield, E(RnjIt) is the real interest rate and E(njIt) is
the ination expected to prevail over the n periods given the information set at time t, It. The
above relationships imply that any change in bond yields and bond prices are by denition caused by
changes in the information set It. Therefore, news can cause revisions to what is currently built into
the corporate bond prices.5 More specic to our paper's topic, news about a short sell ban in the stock
market could cause corporate bond market participants to revise their expectations, and this could
be reected in higher corporate bond market volatility compared with a period free of such event.
This theoretical result motivated us to explore empirically the eects that such event implied for the
corporate bond market variables: returns, volatility and liquidity.
5Ederington and Lee (1993) reported that macro announcements seem to be responsible for most of the volatilities
in the bond markets.
3This research contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, this paper exam-
ines jointly the stock and corporate bond markets dynamic properties. In the market microstructure
literature, there are some recent papers, as for example Chordia et al. (2005), Goyenko et al. (2009
a and b), that analyzed the joint stock and bond markets dynamics. However their research inves-
tigated joint dynamics of stocks and treasury, having as underlying motivation a \ight-to-quality"
phenomenon.6 This is not our case framework since both assets considered are risky. Second, it
examines the corporate bond market reactions to a short sell ban in the stocks market, a topic that
did not receive attention so far in the theoretical and empirical short selling literature. Moreover it
investigates the relationship between these two markets and reactions to the ban during the 2008 -
nancial crisis, an important topic since relationships among dierent assets and nancial markets may
be very dierent during nancial turbulence periods versus the normal times. The liquidity behavior
during a nancial crisis, for example, a subject of high interest for nancial market participants and
regulators, may be very dierent compared to the one from the normal periods. In this respect, our
empirical study may potentially be of high interest to anyone who monitors nancial markets since
investors may behave in an unusual manner at certain points during a business cycle, as for example
a recession or nancial downturn. Market participants may perceive, at least temporary, that some
macroeconomic announcements, as for example a short sell ban, is more important than others which
in turn will lead to heightened attention being paid to the respective news. Therefore it is reasonable
to assume dierent market reactions depending on the state of the business cycle. Since the short
sell ban was one of the levers that regulators pulled to manage the 2008 nancial crisis, this study
allows us to shed some light on the un-addressed in the literature but signicant economic question
on whether this lever worked or should be pulled.
We model volatilities, returns and transaction costs of equity and corporate bond markets simul-
taneously using the vector autoregression method (VAR).7 VAR method is in particular suitable for
our investigation because it allows an explicit comparison of liquidity and other markets variables of
interest across dierent macroeconomic regimes. This method allows one variable to depend on the
current and lagged values of other variables under study building a system that incorporates causal
and feedback eects among the two markets variables. Moreover, the econometric methodology pro-
posed in this paper is suitable for studying the long-run equilibrium properties of two markets in which
6Flight-to-quality means the action of investors moving their capital away from riskier investments to the safest
possible investment vehicles. This ight is usually caused by uncertainty in the nancial markets.
7VAR method was pioneered in market microstructure analysis by Hasbrouck (1995). Recent papers that modeled
simultaneously dierent markets using VAR method are Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005), Goyenko et al.
(2009 a and b).
4assets are traded with dierent frequencies.8 In this modeling framework we can explicitly deal with
questions related to the information contained in prices, how information is assimilated across the two
markets, the behavior of transaction prices and how the spreads respond to the same market generated
as well as other markets or/and public information. We construct impulse-response functions that
show how the system reacts to a perturbation to its long-run equilibrium. Impulse response analysis
is, also, useful for documenting market resilience i.e. the speed with which market variables tend to
converge back to the initial equilibrium after a perturbation to the system. In addition, we are able
to investigate causality issues among the two markets' variables by running Granger-causality tests,
and construct markets' predictions at dierent horizons using forecast error variance decomposition
tool.
Our empirical ndings point to a deterioration in both stock and corporate bond markets quality
for the rms that were subject to September 2008 short sell restrictions. The short sell ban had a
negative impact for the liquidity in the stock and corporate bond markets as bid-ask spreads widened,
increased the volatility in both markets, and price in the corporate bond market revealed a decreasing
trend. This last fact coupled with a substantial increase in the corporate bonds volume for the rms
subject to the ban suggested the possibility that short selling strategy might had been intensied in the
corporate bond market after the ban, potentially due to moving some pessimists from the stock market
into the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. In this respect, our results have some policy implications,
supporting an integrated view regarding future regulatory measures. For nancial markets law-makers
and regulators, it suggests that future regulatory measures should consider simultaneous actions in
both markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the short selling literature
and discusses our contribution to this literature. Section 3 describes our empirical hypotheses. Section
4 presents data and denes the system's variables. Section 5 describes the transaction costs' calcula-
tions for the two markets. Section 6 reviews the VAR method used. The main results are discussed
in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Tough there is an extensive literature that analyzes the stock market eects of restricting short selling
strategies for stocks, none of the papers investigated so far either at the theoretical or empirical level
how these restrictions impact the corporate bond market, meaning if there are some spillover eects
8Manganelli (2005) investigated this topic using only stock market data.
5from announcements and restrictions applied in the stock market into the corporate bond market.
This potentially might have happened due to the fact that, unlike the stock market, only recently the
corporate bond market became transparent.9 10
The prior short selling research focused on the eects that such measure had for the stocks market
quality, or made comparisons across countries that experienced a ban versus the ones that did not
experience such measures in the stock market. The academic literature provided evidence support-
ing the fact that short sale constraints, regulatory restrictions reduce the ecient pricing of assets,
especially in times of negative news.
At the theoretical level, a referential paper is Miller (1977). He advanced the idea that, in a market
with little or no short selling, the demand for a particular security will come from the minority who
holds the most optimistic expectation about it, and since divergence of opinions is likely to increase
with risk, it is possible that expected returns will be lower for risky securities rather than higher.
Diamond and Verechia (1987) investigated the eects of short sale constraints on the speed of
price-adjustment to private information. Their model predicted that, in the presence of short sale
constraints, information has an asymmetric impact on asset prices meaning that the short sell con-
straints result in a dierent dissemination of positive and negative information.
Work by Abrew and Brunnermeier (2002), Andersen (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)
showed that short sale constraints can lead to bubbles and excessive volatility.
Lamont (2004) examined the eects of short sales and market frictions on the eciency of price
discovery for a sample of rms that took legal and regulatory actions to impede the short sales of
their stocks. He found that rms which took these actions underperformed in the year subsequent to
the legal and regulatory action, a result consistent with the hypothesis that short sales constraints
facilitate stock overpricing resulting in low expected returns.
Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) made the rst step in investigating the eects of imposing short
sell restrictions across markets by comparing the stock market variables of countries in which this
strategy was restricted versus the ones where it was not. They analyzed historical short selling data,
put option trading regulations and practices for 111 countries. The authors concluded that the way the
liquidity will evolve in the restricted markets will depend on which eect dominates: investors' trading
activity determined by market returns or inventory concerns determined by volatility. Charoenrook
and Daouk (2005) found that when short selling is possible, aggregate stock returns are less volatile,
9For the detailed information regarding Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system implementation
see www.nasd.com.
10See Bessembinder et al. (2005, 2006), Edwards et al. (2007) for the eects TRACE implementation had on corporate
bond market quality.
6there is greater liquidity, and the overall market quality improves. They did not nd any evidence
that short-sale restrictions increase the probability of a market crash.11
3 Empirical Hypotheses
In this section we will address several specic empirical questions and formulate the hypotheses re-
garding the eects of the short sell restrictions applied in the stock market for the corporate bond
market variables. For each of these questions, we will rst discuss the theoretical background and
then derive the testable implications.
A very popular class of models in the market microstructure literature is the asymmetric informa-
tion one.12 13 These models examine market dynamics subject to a single source of uncertainty, that
is, a single information event. However in the actual securities markets, information often arrive in a
lumpy fashion. Long periods with no new information and steady or sluggish trading are punctuated
by periods of extremely active trading before, during, and after major news announcements. These
models' general implication is that market activity and volatility change over time because new infor-
mation becomes available to traders at a varying rate, therefore volume and volatility inuence prices
because they are correlated with private information about the securities' true value.
A dierent group of models, which is the sequential market trade group, makes a step further by
establishing a connection between information asymmetries and observable market phenomena. The
simple sequential trade model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), for example, posits that the proportion
of informed traders in the population is positively related to both bid-ask spread and the revisions
in beliefs. These results suggest using the bid-ask spread or the impact an order has on subsequent
prices as proxies for the asymmetric information.
Recent microstructure research proposed a multi market simultaneous analysis for better modeling
and understanding of the nancial markets linkages.14 Other markets variables could help explain a
particular security dynamics since markets for dierent securities often interact. These other variables
include orders, trades and prices of related securities. By considering other markets relevant variables
11Research on the stock short sell restrictions subject is more extensive, but the focus is on other issues than the ones
we investigate in this paper: cross markets eects. For an extended review of this literature, readers can refer to work
by Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2004), Shkilko, Bonnie Van Ness, and Robert Van Ness (2007), Daske, Richardson, and
Tuna (2005), Diether, Lee and Werner (2005), Chen and Singal (2001), Hong and Stein (2003).
12The referential paper is Bagehot (1971).
13There is an extensive literature that built on this idea as for example Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
Easley and O'Hara (1987, 1992), O'Hara (1995), Diamond and Verrechia (1987), Admati and Peiderer (1988).
14For example, Chordia et al. (2001) and Goyenko et al. (2009) showed that stocks and bonds (treasury) liquidities
comove. Also, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), Chordia et al. (2005) suggested that macroeconomic variables and
stock price volatility may impact bond market liquidity by aecting market-making costs.
7we obtain multivariate models that, under certain circumstances, can identify price changes with a
particular source of information.15 Relying on dierent securities interaction hypothesis Huang and
Stoll (1997), for example, based their three-way decomposition of a stock spread on the fact that
inventory-induced quote changes result not only from inventory changes in the stock being examined
but, also, from inventory changes in other stocks. Their approach assumed that inventory eects relate
to the entire portfolios held by the suppliers of the liquidity. Huang and Stoll (1997) hypothesis was
that a liquidity supplier who buys a stock at the bid will not only lower the bid and ask prices of the
respective stock, but will also lower the bid and ask prices of other correlated stocks. The portfolio
approach analysis allows for the possibility that quotes in a security be adjusted by a dierent amount
than the one implied by the information content or inventory eect only for the respective stock.
Selling and buying pressure in other securities will produce quote changes in the respective stock as
the liquidity suppliers attempt to keep their overall portfolio in balance. Huang and Stoll (1997) noted
that this type of adjustments were obvious during October 1987 market crash event, when relentless
selling pressure in the absence of any specic news produced inventory-induced quote changes in
specic stocks. The authors provided, also, a motivation for considering the empirical analysis of
dierent securities jointly using an econometric method that accounts for correlations across securities
(as our proposed VAR method does). Because all securities respond to marketwide public information,
and the public information shocks could be contemporaneously correlated across securities, they claim
that, by modeling simultaneously n securities, we may get a more ecient estimation.
In our particular equity and corporate bond markets framework, the theoretical explanation goes
back to Merton (1974). He showed that both equity and corporate bond are derivatives of the same
rm's value, therefore it should be a relationship between the values of these two securities, and
between the equity and corporate bond markets. In practice, also, a number of asset allocation
strategies shift wealth between the stock and corporate bond markets so the trading processes may
reect these long-term interactions and may exhibit other dependencies as well. Consequently, trades
across these two markets may be correlated, also, for non-informational issues as for example optimal
portfolio choices and arbitrage.
Our rst question and empirical hypothesis is based on Holden (1995) theoretical model. The
underlying model assumption was that information ows may dier in security markets that trade at
dierent frequencies, leading to divergence in market prices and introducing the possibility of arbitrage
between markets.16 Holden (1995) built a model in which arbitrageurs optimally exploit arbitrage
15See Hamilton (1994) ch. 10 and 11 for the general modeling aspects, and Hasbrouck (1988, 1991 a and b, 1993) for
microstructure applications.
16See also Manganelli (2005).
8opportunities between the markets for two securities: stock (stock index portfolio) and \synthetic
stocks" (stock index futures and bonds). With dierent liquidity shocks in each market, there are
dierent realized prices (or liquidity premia) in each market. In Holden (1995) model, the arbitrage
trading connects the two markets and reduce the price dierence between the two securities.17 18
Holden (1995) examines the eects of the arbitrage trading on markets' volatilities, liquidities and
the hedging eectiveness of the synthetic securities as measured by intermarket price correlation. He
made a comparison between a restricted economy where arbitrage is prohibited and an unrestricted
economy where arbitrage is permitted, and showed that permitting arbitrage causes no net change in
volatility, an increase in the liquidity of the markets, and an increase in the hedging eectiveness of
the synthetic securities.19
Question No. 1: What are the eects of a liquidity shock in the stock market for the corporate
bond market liquidity, returns and volatility ?
This question implies the investigation of several related questions as following:
Are liquidity shocks in the stock market transmitted into the corporate bond market? Does stock
market liquidity forecast returns in the corporate bond market? In other words, do liquidity level in the
stock market provide any information about the future liquidity and liquidity premia in the corporate
bond market?
In our empirical framework, we assumed that the liquidity shock in the stock market is the imposed
short sell ban. Our rst hypothesis is the testable implication of Holden (1995) model:
H1: After imposing short sale restrictions in the stock market (a liquidity shock in the stock mar-
ket), we hypothesize that liquidity in the stock and corporate bond markets will decrease. Moreover,
we expect volatility in both markets to remain the same.
Market liquidity is a fundamental concept in nance and it refers to the ability of buying or selling
17Within the same line of research, Subrahmanyam (1991) built a model that showed how the introduction of a basket
of securities had implications for the informativeness and variability of prices, and market liquidity. He characterized the
strategic trading decision of liquidity traders that may trade either in individual securities or portfolios, and examined
the \lead-lag" relationships between these, which means that the tendency for movements in one price provides predictive
information about subsequent movements in another price. Subrahmanyam (1991) showed that movements in both the
price of the individual security and the price of the basket provide information about the subsequent movements in the
price of the other.
18See, also, Kumar and Seppi (1989) for research in the same thread.
19Grossman and Miller (1988) claimed that arbitrageurs, by taking osetting positions in dierent markets simul-
taneously, can smooth the pressure of order imbalances from one market to the other, therefore price concession and
the cost of transacting are kept smaller in both markets due to arbitrage trading. Their opinion was that the eective
market-making capacity during and in the period immediately after the October 1987 crash was reduced by imposing
restrictions on \program trading" which cut the arbitrage.
9large quantities of assets quickly and at a low cost. Market liquidity is high when it is easy to raise
money by selling the asset instead of borrowing against it, meaning that it is high when selling the
asset does not depress the sale price too much. Everybody who stands ready to take on the other side
of a trade provides market liquidity. These include opportunistic traders or potential investors who
are ready to jump in whenever selling/buying pressures cause a temporary price decrease/rise. Large
price movements will occur when several traders attempt to get out of the identical positions at the
same time.
Our second question relates to a dierent understanding of the market liquidity concept than the
one stated above, which is market resilience. As Kyle (1985) noted, \market liquidity" is a slippery and
elusive concept, in part because it encompasses a number of transactional properties of the markets.
These include \tightness" (the cost of turning around a position over a short period of time), \depth"
(the size of an order ow innovation required to change prices a given amount), and \resiliency" ( the
speed with which prices recover from a random, uninformative shock).20 Our second hypothesis refers
to the \resiliency" understanding of the market liquidity concept which means: if the price drops
temporarily how long it will take to bounce back?
From the liquidity perspective, multimarket linkages introduce complex, and often conicting
eects on market liquidity. While portfolio rebalance motives and arbitrage would ultimately draw
the markets together, their immediate impact is to increase the bid-ask spread in both markets, thus
reducing the liquidity in both. With respect to the market resilience concept, we formulate our second
question as following:
Question No. 2: What are the eects of a liquidity shock in stock market for the stock and corporate
bond markets' resilience ?
Our second hypothesis regarding the market resilience is the following:
H2: A short sell restriction in the stock market increases market resilience in the stock market and
decreases market resilience in the corporate bond market.
Many market microstructure models showed that, in the limit, prices converge to their full infor-
mation values, but they do not give any information about the speed or time this adjustment process
takes, and how exactly this convergence is impacted by multimarket considerations. Subrahmanyam
(1991) suggested that, if agents have symmetric access to both systematic and idiosyncratic infor-
20Black dened a liquid market as one which is almost innitely tight, which is not innitely deep, and which is
resilient enough so that prices eventually tend to their underlying value.
10mation, then neither market can act as a dominant price discovery market. However agents in the
\price discovery" literature may nd prices in some market more informative about the true value
of the asset traded in the respective market than prices in other markets. Dierential learning that
divergent prices permit to the market participants may have an eect on the speed of convergence to
the assets' full information values for dierent markets.
Manganelli (2005) took the rst step in investigating empirically the dierences in the speed of
convergence for securities belonging to the same market. Using a sample of 10 stocks separated in two
groups according to their trading intensity, he found that price variance of more frequently traded
stocks converges more rapidly to the long-run equilibrium after an initial perturbation. Our third
question extends Manganelli (2005) investigation from stock market to multimarket considerations.
We investigate the speed of convergence to the full information value for the variables in the corporate
bond market after a stock market perturbation (short sell ban). In this respect, useful tools for this
kind of analysis are VAR's impulse response functions.
Question No. 3: How long does it take for the new information regarding the short sell ban in the
stock market to be impounded into the corporate bond prices?
Our testable implication for the third question is:
H3: Volatility of corporate bonds, which are less frequently traded securities than stocks, should
converge less rapidly than volatility of stocks to their long run equilibrium after an initial perturbation
in the stock market.
Theoretical models with dierences in beliefs predict that short sales constrains should cause stock
prices to rise and become overvalued. In these models, shorting restrictions eliminate the pessimist
investors from the market, and optimist investors do not take into account the absence of pessimists
in setting prices. Supposing that the pessimistic investors actively manage a portfolio of stocks and
bonds, we expect that, being restricted to short sell in the stock market, these investors will move the
short selling activities from the restricted stock market into the unrestricted corporate bond market.
Moreover, recent work by Berkovitz et al. (2009) pointed out toward a growing empirical literature
which argues that short sellers are informed traders because short interest is predictive of negative
abnormal returns. The literature argues that short sellers appear to earn substantial abnormal trading
prots due to their superior analytical skills. Using data for 26 banks that covered the 2008 nancial
crisis period, Berkovitz et al. (2009) found evidence consistent with the view that informed short sellers
stepped in to take advantage of the high levels of uncertainty by trading on information regarding the
11potential eects of the nancial institutions' default risk.
From the perspective of the liquidity traders a conjecture that was not addressed so far in the
microstructure models but it is often stated, is that liquidity traders prefer less volatile markets.
According to Admati and Peiderer (1988), they prefer to trade when the market is \thick", that is
when their trading has little impact on prices, creating a concentration of trading activity. On the
other hand, informed traders, also, want to trade when the market is thick. Consequently, liquidity
could be enhanced in a less volatile market by simply adding more market participants willing to
trade. In our stock short sell ban context, this will imply that liquidity in the corporate bond market
would increase due to the increased number of market participants willing to trade in the unrestricted
market.
Our fourth question is related to the short selling theoretical models' implication which is elimi-
nating the pessimist investors, mostly informed investors according to the literature, from the stock
market. Given a specic trading mechanism, it may be possible to investigate the eects of multiple in-
formed traders on market behavior. This is the approach taken in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992),
who developed a multi-period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically
exploit their long-lived information.
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) showed that, in contrast to Kyle's results, the informed traders
tend to trade more aggressively than their monopolist counterpart. In the limit, as the number of
informed traders goes to innity, all their private information is revealed immediately. The same result
holds with just two informed traders, as the number of auctions (trades) increases and tends to innity.
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) illustrated the dierence between the imperfectly competitive case
and the monopolistic case with a series of numerical simulations. Their simulations showed that price
variance and market liquidity parameter decline very rapidly to zero through time as the number
of informed traders or the number of auctions increase. Our fourth question and hypothesis is the
testable implication of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) theoretical model in the short sell ban
context.
Question No. 4: Do pessimist investors switch from the stock market into the corporate bond
market after imposing a short sell ban in the stock market?
The question can be reformulated to a more testable version:
Does a short sell ban in the stock market result in a greater activity in the corporate bond market
due to potentially a higher number of informed traders who switch from the stock market into the
corporate bond market?
Our testable implication of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) model is the following:
12H4: A short sell ban in the stock market has as eect an increase in the corporate bond market
volume and price variance.
Therefore, we hypothesize that, in our short sell ban context, the pessimist investors, being re-
stricted to short sell in the stock market, switch into the corporate bond market, and this result in
an increase in the number of traders and trading intensity.
4 Data and Variables
We use tick-by-tick stock data from Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database and corporate bond data from
Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system for the 900 nancial rms on which the
stock short sell ban was imposed in September 2008. The data are read from the TAQ and TRACE
data les on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) using the remote processing SAS/CONNECT
software and cover the period from May 1st to September 30th, 2008.
The major problem while using TAQ data for stock spread calculations is that Trades and Quotes
are recorded in two dierent les and one needs rst to reconstruct the trading activity timeline. From
TAQ Consolidated Trades data we get the actual trade price per share and the number of shares traded
while from TAQ Consolidated Quotes we get the bid and oer prices. Therefore, in order to obtain an
as accurate as possible path of the actual trading activity and get an as accurate as possible measures
of stock market spreads, a crucial step is merging trades and quotes in an appropriate manner that
reects the time when each occurred.
Merging Trades and Quotes les has to be done with care accounting for several problems ac-
knowledged by the empirical market microstructure research. One problem is that trades and quotes
updates take place at dierent times. Usually quotes are updated after a trade takes place. Another
known problem is that the time stamps on trades and quotes are systematically dierent. The main
reason is that quotes are entered into the system by the specialist, while trades are entered by the
exchange clerks. Because his trading prots are at stake, the specialist will usually enter the quotes
in a very timely manner. In contrast, data executed on trades serve primarily an accounting pur-
pose, and the immediate recording is not essential as for the quotes. As a result, trades are typically
entered with a delay, mostly ranging between 5 and 15 seconds. Moreover, because reported trades
represent matches of buyers and sellers at a certain price, trade direction cannot be observed directly.
Therefore we need to employ a method to identify if the trade is a buyer or a seller initiated trade.
13The two commonly used procedures to infer trade direction from trades and quotes data are the tick
test and the quote test.21 The tick test classies a trade as buyer-initiated if the trade price is above
the previous price. Correspondingly, when the current price is below the previous one the trade is
classied as seller-initiated. The quote test compares the current price to the prevailing quotes. If the
transaction takes place above the quotes midpoint, it is considered to be buyer-initiated while if it is
below the midpoint it is considered to be seller-initiated. For this paper, we computed both measures,
and, as suggested by Lee and Ready (1991), use a combination of them to infer trade direction.
We obtained the data set necessary to calculate the stock transaction costs by the following steps.
In a preliminary step, we combined all trades that took place at the same second and price. The
underlying intuition is that these individually reported trades are in fact part of the same order, and
therefore should be combined (by summing the number of shares). The next preliminary step was to
correct the time stamps which means to correct the reporting delay associated with the trade time (ve
seconds delay), and compute the tick test. Then we computed the quote changes that also aected
the quote midpoint and we combined the trades and quotes. In order to estimate the transaction costs
measures we need to identify the quotes that were posted at the time a trade was executed. From the
merged data set, the most recent quote record that precedes a certain trade is the prevailing quote
for the respective trade.
The stock intraday data were purged for the following reasons: trades out of sequence, trades
recorded before the opening, 9:30 a.m., or after the closing time, 16:00 p.m., and trades with special
settlement conditions (because they might be subject to distinct liquidity considerations). Negative
bid-ask spread quotations, transaction prices, and quoted depths were discarded. Following Lee and
Ready (1991), any quote less than ve seconds prior to the trade is ignored and the rst one at least
ve seconds prior to the trade is retained.
The TRACE data set includes all reported Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades in corporate bonds.
Data items include price, dollar quantity of the transaction, yield and the side (or sides for interdealer
transactions) on which the dealer participated. Same as in the case of TAQ data, we dropped any
transaction that occurred before opening time, 9:30 a.m., and after the closing time, 16:00 p.m..
Due to the fact that TRACE database does not contain information about bids and asks, we need
to estimate corporate bond transaction costs using an econometric model. Consequently we have to
use some data that allow us to control for the fundamental bonds' values. We obtain data on stock
returns, risk-free interest rate, BBB-AAA credit spreads, and VIX index.22 We use TAQ database for
21See Lee and Ready (1991).
22VIX is the ticker symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, a popular measure of the
14the individual stock prices and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database for the
market index. We use the Federal Reserve's (FED) constant-maturity Treasury bond yields for the
risk-free interest rates. The BBB and AAA bond yields are obtained from the FED's website, and
the VIX data from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) website.
The variables to be included in the vector autoregression are returns from both markets, volatilities
and transaction costs. The way we calculated the daily aggregate values for the variables to be included
in the VAR, was rst by computing from tick data the equal-weighted average of each variable for
each security, and then obtaining the equal-weighted average across all securities for each day. The
returns are computed as the dierence in log prices.
5 Transaction Costs Calculations
5.1 Stocks Transaction Costs Calculation






where Ask and Bid are intraday stock quoted ask and bid prices.
Alternatively, one can use the stock eective spread which is calculated as twice the absolute value
of the dierence between trade price and the midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask quote.
5.2 Corporate Bonds Transaction Costs Estimation Method
As Edwards et al. (2007) pointed out, corporate bond data present two challenges for the transaction
costs measurement. First, since quotation data do not exist for the corporate bond market23, we
cannot estimate transaction costs for each corporate bond trade using transaction methods based on
benchmark prices such as the quoted or eective spreads. Instead we need to estimate the transaction
costs using an econometric model. The second problem relates to the scarcity of data for many
bonds. Since the econometric model does not benet from information in contemporaneous observable
benchmark prices, our results are less precise than if such information were available.
We employ Huang and Stoll (1997) indicator variable model as extended by Bessembinder et al.
(2005) for estimating corporate bond transaction costs. In what is following we will briey introduce
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. A high value corresponds to a more volatile market and therefore more
costly options, which can be used to defray risk from this volatility by selling options. Often referred to as the fear
index, it represents one measure of the market's expectation of volatility over the next 30 day period.
23TRACE does not have quotation data.
15Bessembinder et al. (2005) model.
Let St denote the eective round trip spread, meaning the dierence between the price at which
dealers will sell a bond and the price at which they will purchase the bond at time t. Let Pt denote
the transaction price at time t, Vt denote the unobservable true value of the bond at time t, and let
Qt be an indicator variable that equals 1 if the time t trade is a customer buy, -1 if it is a customer
sell, and 0 if it is an interdealer trade.
Innovations in the underlying value of the bond are attributable to public information releases
and, potentially, private information revealed through buy or sell orders:
Vt = Vt 1 + Qt 1 + "t; (4)
where  reects the private information content of a buy or sell order and "t represents new public
information. We assume that a fraction w of the public information eventually becomes observable
to econometricians in the form of data with realizations Xt, while the remaining portion is due to
unobservable innovations Ut that represent statistical noise:
"t = wXt + (1   w)Ut: (5)
Assuming that the spread is symmetric, customers buy (sell) at a price that exceeds (is less than)
the underlying bond value by half the eective spread:




Let  denote the dierence between the observation at date t and the preceding observation, then
the rst dierences of the previous three expressions can be combined to give:
Pt = wXt + Qt 1 + (
St
2
)Qt + (1   w)Ut: (7)
The last two expressions suggest that the half spread can be estimated by appropriately specied
regressions of observed (changes in) prices on (changes in) buy-sell indicator variables.
Based on the last equation, we estimate regressions of the form
Pt = a + wXt + Qt 1 + (
St
2
)Qt + t: (8)
The specication is identical to the regression equation 5 in Huang and Stoll (1997) with the
exception that Bessembinder et al. (2005) allows for the eect of observable public information on
16the underlying bond value. The authors claim that the inclusion of public information is potentially
important for corporate bonds since the elapsed time between trades can be long. We assumed, as
the authors, the spread to be symmetric or, equivalently, that the dealer inventory cost do not aect
dealer reservation prices.




= b0 + b1Z
t ; (9)
where the  denotes the fact that the variable Zt is expressed as deviations from its own time
series mean.
Substituting the last equation in the previous one gives an expanded indicator regression model:
Pt = a + wXt + Qt 1 + b0Qt + b1Z
t Qt + t: (10)
In the last expression, the coecient b0 estimates the half-spread conditional on a specic outcome
on the explanatory variable Zt, while the coecient b1 estimates the eect of variable Zt on the half-
spread. The candidates for inclusion in Zt should be variables that plausibly aect the cost of corporate
bond market making. For example, Demsetz (1968) had argued that increased trading volume should
reduce bid-ask spreads. Therefore we opted, following Edwards et al (2006) and Bessembinder et al.
(2005), for the selection of the dollar trading volume as the Zt variable.
6 Econometric Method for Investigating Cross Markets Ef-
fects
In this section we discuss the econometric procedure used to investigate cross market eects, which
is vector autoregressive method (VAR). We review briey the method and the test statistics that is
used to evaluate if there is any relationship across markets during the investigated period.
Vector autoregression method (VAR) is one of the most widely used method in empirical nance.
The underlying assumption in VAR analysis is that the evolution of the endogenous variables of
interest can be represented by a set of simultaneous linear equations yt with yt = [y1;t;:::yk;t]0 where
k = 2 in our case, with each variables having feedback from its own lags and other variables lags. All
VAR equations include lags up to a maximum of order p where p is determined, in our case, using
Akaike information criterion (AIC).
17The joint dynamics of the endogenous variables for the two markets is modeled using the reduced
form VAR:
yt = ct + 1yt 1 + 2yt 2 + ::: + pyt p + "t; (11)
where ct is the vectors of deterministic terms, and "t are the error terms that are assumed to have
a non-diagonal variance-covariance matrix E[utu0
t] = . We assume that the error terms are serially
uncorrelated across markets.
In what is following we present shortly the main VAR tools that we employ: impulse responses,
variance decomposition and Granger causality test.
In the applied VAR literature it is very rare to report VAR coecients. Since the number of
parameters is large, presenting all of them is cumbersome. Furthermore, they are poorly estimated:
except for the rst own lag, they are usually all insignicant. It is therefore wide practice to report
functions of the VAR coecients which summarizes information better, have some economic meaning,
and are potentially more precisely estimated. Among the many possible functions two are the most
used: impulse response functions and variance decomposition.
Impulse responses trace out the moving average (MA) of the system, i.e. they describe how yi;t+
responds to a shock in e0
i;t. The main purpose of the impulse response functions is to identify structural
shocks. Calculation of meaningful impulse responses requires orthogonal disturbances, meaning that
they are mutually uncorrelated and have a diagonal variance covariance matrix E[utu0
t] = D, which
in our case will be market specic.
In order to identify responses of the endogenous variables yt to the structural shocks, we need to
nd a matrix A such that Aut = "t, hence  = ADA0. If each A is a full-rank nxn matrix, then we
can dene as an impulse response vector any column a of this matrix A.
We calculate the impulse response functions using the nonrecursive (companion) form approach.
We stack the equations as
Yt = Yt 1 + Ut; (12)





1 2 ::: p 1 p
In 0 ::: 0 0
0 In ::: 0 0




The rst k rows of the h provide the endogenous variables responses to the shocks, where h represents
the horizon of interest.
18The variance decomposition measures the contribution of e
0
i;t shock to the deviations of yi;t+
from the baseline forecasted path, where  = 1;2;::: . To derive the variance decomposition, we need
rstly to calculate the -step-ahead forecast error yt+   ^ yt+jt and the mean square error of the
forecast (MSE), MSE(^ yt+jt) = E[(yt+   ^ yt+jt)(yt+   ^ yt+jt)0]. Hence, the percentage change of
the variance in yi;t+ due to e
0
i;t is the fraction of the variance due to each individual shock divided
by the MSE of the  forecast period.
Since VARs are reduced-form models, it is impossible to economically interpret the dynamics
induced by their disturbances unless theory comes into play. Typically, restrictions employed by the
literature included restrictions on the short run or the long run impact of certain shocks on VAR
variables or informational delays. Selecting meaningful restrictions is always a dicult task. To
disentangle the shocks that might aect the variables of the market k, we make some assumptions and
impose a particular causal ordering of the endogenous variable using the Cholesky decomposition of
matrix . For examples we assumed that \surprises" in the price level and volatility may be associated
with changes in trading volume. Therefore our chosen ordering for VAR variables was to place bond
and stock returns rst, and place bond and stock transaction costs last, after the markets' volatilities.
One key question that can be addressed with vector autoregression method is how useful some
variables are for forecasting the others. If a variable y1;t cannot help forecast another variable y2;t,
we say that y1;t does not Granger-cause y2;t. More formally, y1;t fails to Granger-cause y2;t if for all
s > 0 the mean squared error of a forecast of y1;t+s based on (y1;t;y1;t 1;:::) is the same as the MSE
of a forecast of y1;t+s that uses both (y1;t;y1;t 1;:::) and (y2;t;y2;t 1;:::).
We investigate if the stock liquidity shock had any impact for the corporate bond market variables
using the block exogeneity version of the Granger causality test. Thus, to test the null hypothesis that
the n1 variables represented by y1 are block-exogenous with respect to the n2 variables represented
by y2, we perform OLS regressions of each of the elements of y1 on a constant, p lags of all of the
elements of y1, and p lags of all of the elements of y2, then we calculate the variance-covariance matrix
of residuals, ^ 





1;t]. Next we perform OLS regressions of each of the elements of y1
on a constant and p lags of all the elements of y1, then we calculate the variance-covariance matrix
for the residuals obtained from this regression ^ 







11(0)j   logj^ 
11jg (14)
is greater than the 5% critical value for a 2(n1n2) variable, then the null hypothesis is rejected, and
the conclusion is that some of the elements of y2 are helpful in forecasting y1.
197 Empirical Results
7.1 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 report the summary statistics for the 900 tickers under our investigation. For variables
used from both markets we report the total number of observations, the mean, median, mode, standard
deviation, skewness, kurtosis, range and interquartile range in order to capture a detailed picture
about the distributions of the variables in the two markets. The sharp dierence in the number
of observations for the price variable (which also represents the number of trades in the market)
between the two markets reects an important dierence for the stock and corporate bond markets
which is trading intensity. For the period May 1st-September 30th 2008 the number of observations
for the corporate bond market was 772,972 while for the same period, for the stock market, it was
553,251,045. Only for September 1st-September 30th 2008 period, which is also the period we consider
for the VAR investigation, the number of observations for price was 156,280,190 for the stock market
while the corresponding number for the corporate bonds was 202,624. However, with respect to the
dollar volume, the average volume of a corporate bond transaction is much higher in comparison to a
stock one. For example, only for September the average dollar volume for the corporate bond market
was $350,535.927, while for the same period the average dollar volume for the stock market was only
$7,639.771.
The evolution of the nancial turbulence is reected, also, by the variables' descriptive statistics.
For example, the daily average bond price was $91.3036 for the May-September period while the
mean price only for the September month was $78.4264. The average daily yield reects the same
developments with an average daily yield of $35.7634 for the May-September period while it raised to
$111.5382 during the September trading days. On the other hand the stock prices display much less
variation over the period. The daily average price was $27.2190 for the May-September period and
only slightly lower for the September month, at an average of $25.1968.
7.2 Results for Hypotheses Investigation
The focus of our empirical analysis will be on cross-market eects and causality issues between the
stock and corporate bond markets.
Investigating Question No. 1: What are the eects of a liquidity shock in the stock market for the
corporate bond market liquidity, returns and volatility ?
In order to answer this question, we rst estimate the VAR model then we obtain impulse response
functions and conduct Granger causality tests. The impulse response functions (IRFs) uncover the
20joint dynamics implied by the VAR system. IRFs trace the impact of a one-time, unit standard devi-
ation shock on the current and future values of the endogenous variables. In order to get meaningful
IRFs, innovations are orthogonalized using a Cholesky decomposition of the VAR residuals.24 We
plot the impulse responses and the 95 % theoretical condence bands for a period of 20 trading days
(steps).
Figure 10 displays the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables to a shock in the
stock market liquidity. The impulse responses show that a shock in the stock market liquidity had as
result a decrease in the corporate bond market returns and liquidity, and an increase in the corporate
bond market volatility. The condence intervals are tight around the impulse response functions
suggesting a good choice of lag length and signicant responses.
Table 5 reports Granger-causality tests among the endogenous variables. The tests are reported
assuming the same number of lags in VAR for variables from both markets. Based on Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC), we chose a VAR model with one lag length. We found that the stock market
liquidity Granger-cause corporate bond volatility and the time-series cross-dependence is signicant at
5 % (p-value=0.0164). We, also, found that causality between the stock and corporate bond markets
volatilities runs in both directions and is signicant at 10 % (p-value=0.0574 when causality runs
from the stocks volatility toward the corporate bonds volatility, and p-value=0.0249 when causality
runs from the corporate bonds volatility toward the stocks volatility). Moreover, stock market re-
turns Granger-cause corporate bonds volatility (p-value=0.0071), and corporate bond market returns
Granger-cause stocks volatility (p-value=0.0099).
From investigating the correlation among VAR variables for the September 2008 period (Table 3)
we found that cross market correlations were positive and relatively high with the exception of the
correlation between stocks volatility and corporate bonds returns which was strong and negative.
Therefore, using data for the September 2008 nancial crisis period, our empirical results support
partially hypothesis 1 by nding that liquidity decreased in both markets.
Investigating Question No. 2: What are the eects of a liquidity shock in the stock market for the
stock and corporate bond markets' resilience ? (where market resilience was dened as the speed with
24For the VAR methodology, we investigated results for two ordering schemes of the variables due to the assumptions
we made for identication. Through the ordering we attempt to identify the orthogonal structural shocks, decomposing
the shocks to the observables into orthogonal unobserved components. We consequently made just-identied (non-
testable) assumptions corresponding to a particular ordering of the endogenous variables in the Cholesky decomposition
of matrix . In the rst ordering we placed returns from bonds and stocks rstly, then volatilities in the two markets,
and last the corporate bonds and stocks transaction costs. For this ordering, our assumption was that surprises in
liquidity may be associated with surprises in returns and volatility. For the second ordering, we placed corporate bonds
and stocks transaction costs rst then corporate bonds and stocks returns, placing last corporate bonds and stocks
volatilities. Our nding was that results from both orderings were qualitatively similar.
21which prices recover from a random uninformative shock)
In order to answer this question we need to investigate again the impulse response functions of the
endogenous variables to a stock liquidity shock displayed in Figure 10. Figure 10 shows that stock
variables recover faster than corporate bond variables after a stock liquidity shock. The corporate
bond returns and volatility return to the long run equilibrium after 8 periods versus the corresponding
stock variables that return after approximately 6 periods. Therefore, after a stock liquidity shock, the
stock market resilience is higher than the corporate bond market resilience, and our empirical results
conrm hypothesis 2.
Investigating Question No. 3: How long does it take for the new information regarding the short sell
ban in the stock market to be impounded into the corporate bonds prices? Figures 5 through 10 which
display the IRFs give us the possibility to answer this question. The empirical impulse response
functions are consistent with the theoretical simulations reported by Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992). Their model theoretical prediction is that the speed with which variables decline to 0 after
an initial shock should increase with the trading frequency. Summary statistics for the two markets
showed that trading frequency is incomparable much lower for the corporate bond market versus the
stock market. Hence, our obtained empirical IRFs, showing a faster convergence to the long run
equilibrium for stock variables versus the bond variables after an initial perturbation, conrm Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992) theoretical ndings and the empirical evidence from stock market found
by Manganelli (2005).
Investigating Question No. 4: Do pessimist investors switch from the stock market into the corpo-
rate bond market after imposing a short sell ban in the stock market? In order to answer this question
we analyze plots of volumes, prices and spreads from gure 1 and 2, and plots of returns and volatil-
ities from gure 3 and 4 for the two considered markets. The graphs for corporate bonds volume
and volatility for the period May 1st-September 30th and September 1st-September 30th conrm our
fourth hypothesis. After the ban we observe an increase in corporate bond volume and volatility.
228 Conclusion
This empirical study exploits the natural experiment from September 2008 that is the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission Emergency Order prohibiting stocks short sales for 900 nancial rms.
We investigated the impacts such a measure had for the corporate bond market during the September
2008 period. We report evidence that short sale restrictions in the stock market had a negative
impact on corporate bond market quality. This evidence supports an integrated market view from the
regulatory side, suggesting that future regulatory measures should consider simultaneous actions in
both markets.
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28Figure 1: Figure displays plots of daily volume, price and spread for stocks and corporate bonds
belonging to the 900 nancial rms that were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The
daily equally-weighted average is computed rst for each security and then the cross-sectional average
is obtained for each trading day in each market. The data cover the period from May 1st 2008 till
September 30th 2008.
29Figure 2: Figure displays plots of daily volume, price and spread for stocks and corporate bonds
belonging to the 900 nancial rms that were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The daily
equally-weighted average is computed rst for each security and then the cross-sectional average is
obtained for each trading day in each market. The data cover the period from September 1st 2008
till September 30th 2008.
30Figure 3: Figure displays plots of daily returns, volatility and spread for stocks and corporate bonds
belonging to the 900 nancial rms that were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The
daily equally-weighted average is computed rst for each security and then the cross-sectional average
is obtained for each trading day in each market. The data cover the period from May 1st 2008 till
September 30th 2008.
31Figure 4: Figure displays plots of daily returns, volatility and spread for stocks and corporate bonds
belonging to the 900 nancial rms that were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The daily
equally-weighted average is computed rst for each security and then the cross-sectional average is
obtained for each trading day in each market. The data cover the period from September 1st 2008
till September 30th 2008. These variable are the ones that are analyzed using VAR.
32Figure 5: Impulse response functions of endogenous variables to a shock in corporate bonds returns.
The upper, middle and lower lines are, respectively, the 95th, 50th, and 5th percentile based on
the sample of estimated response functions for stocks and corporate bonds belonging to the 900
nancial rms that were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The data cover the period
from September 1st 2008 till September 30th 2008. As notation the following mapping is valid: Retb
are the corporate bonds returns, Rets are the stocks returns, V olatb is the corporate bonds volatility,
V olats is the stocks volatility, Spreadb are the corporate bonds transaction costs, and Spreads are
the stocks transaction costs.
33Figure 6: Impulse response functions of endogenous variables to a shock in stocks returns. The upper,
middle and lower lines are, respectively, the 95th, 50th, and 5th percentile based on the sample of
estimated response functions for stocks and corporate bonds belonging to the 900 nancial rms that
were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The data cover the period from September 1st 2008
till September 30th 2008.As notation the following mapping is valid: Retb are the corporate bonds
returns, Rets are the stocks returns, V olatb is the corporate bonds volatility, V olats is the stocks
volatility, Spreadb are the corporate bonds transaction costs, and Spreads are the stocks transaction
costs.
34Figure 7: Impulse response functions of endogenous variables to a shock in corporate bonds volatility.
The upper, middle and lower lines are, respectively, the 95th, 50th, and 5th percentile based on
the sample of estimated response functions for stocks and corporate bonds belonging to the 900
nancial rms that were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The data cover the period
from September 1st 2008 till September 30th 2008. As notation the following mapping is valid: Retb
are the corporate bonds returns, Rets are the stocks returns, V olatb is the corporate bonds volatility,
V olats is the stocks volatility, Spreadb are the corporate bonds transaction costs, and Spreads are
the stocks transaction costs.
35Figure 8: Impulse response functions of endogenous variables to a shock in stocks volatility. The
upper, middle and lower lines are, respectively, the 95th, 50th, and 5th percentile based on the sample
of estimated response functions for stocks and corporate bonds belonging to the 900 nancial rms
that were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The data cover the period from September
1st 2008 till September 30th 2008. As notation the following mapping is valid: Retb are the corporate
bonds returns, Rets are the stocks returns, V olatb is the corporate bonds volatility, V olats is the stocks
volatility, Spreadb are the corporate bonds transaction costs, and Spreads are the stocks transaction
costs.
36Figure 9: Impulse response functions of endogenous variables to a shock in corporate bonds transaction
costs. The upper, middle and lower lines are, respectively, the 95th, 50th, and 5th percentile based
on the sample of estimated response functions for stocks and corporate bonds belonging to the 900
nancial rms that were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The data cover the period
from September 1st 2008 till September 30th 2008. As notation the following mapping is valid: Retb
are the corporate bonds returns, Rets are the stocks returns, V olatb is the corporate bonds volatility,
V olats is the stocks volatility, Spreadb are the corporate bonds transaction costs, and Spreads are
the stocks transaction costs.
37Figure 10: Impulse response functions of endogenous variables to a shock in stocks transaction costs.
The upper, middle and lower lines are, respectively, the 95th, 50th, and 5th percentile based on
the sample of estimated response functions for stocks and corporate bonds belonging to the 900
nancial rms that were subject to the September 2008 short sell ban. The data cover the period
from September 1st 2008 till September 30th 2008. As notation the following mapping is valid: Retb
are the corporate bonds returns, Rets are the stocks returns, V olatb is the corporate bonds volatility,
V olats is the stocks volatility, Spreadb are the corporate bonds transaction costs, and Spreads are
the stocks transaction costs.
38Table 1: This table provides corporate bonds descriptive statistics for the sample of 900 nancial rms
for which stocks short sell ban was imposed on September 18th 2008. The table gives information
about the distributions of corporate bond transaction variables: corporate bond price, trading volume
and yield, as obtained from the TRACE engine. The period for which we extracted the data set is
May 1st-September 30th 2008.
September May-September
Price








Interquartile Range 28.12500 9.43500
Dollar Volume








Interquartile Range 90,000 56,000
Yield








Interquartile Range 14.73376 2.72534
39Table 2: This table provides stocks descriptive statistics for the sample of 900 nancial rms for
which short sell ban was imposed on September 18th 2008. The table gives information about the
distributions of stocks variables: price and number of shares traded, as obtained from the TAQ trades
data. The period for which we extracted the data set is May 1st-September 30th 2008.
September May-September
Price








Interquartile Range 24.82000 22.12000
Size (Number of Shares)








Interquartile Range 100.00000 100.00000
Table 3: This table displays the correlation matrix for VAR variables. The data used to calculate
correlations in this table cover the period from September 1st 2008 till September 30th 2008. As
notation we denote by Ret to mean returns and V olat to mean volatility.
Ret bonds Ret stocks Volat bonds Volat stocks Spread bonds Spread stocks
Ret bonds 1
Ret stocks 0.0486 1
Volat bonds -0.1679 0.2185 1
Volat stocks -0.4131 -0.4937 0.2459 1
Spread bonds -0.2522 0.2621 0.8206 0.2714 1
Spread stocks 0.4229 -0.0893 0.6180 0.0694 0.4694 1
40Table 4: This table displays the correlation matrix for VAR variables. The data used to calculate
correlations in this table cover the period from May 1st 2008 till September 30th 2008. As notation
we denote by Ret to mean returns and V olat to mean volatility.
Ret bonds Ret stocks Volat bonds Volat stocks Spread bonds Spread stocks
Ret bonds 1
Ret stocks -0.0241 1
Volat bonds -0.2465 0.1057 1
Volat stocks -0.0842 -0.0879 0.0471 1
Spread bonds -0.2745 0.1429 0.8283 0.1532 1
Spread stocks 0.0497 -0.0087 0.8141 0.0060 0.6767 1
Table 5: This table presents Granger Causality Tests (Chi-square statistics and p-values) based on
the VAR estimated for the sample of 900 nancial rms for which short sell ban was imposed on
September 18th 2008. VAR is estimated with one lag. The data cover the period from September
1st 2008 till September 30th 2008. The null hypothesis is that the lagged values of the variables in
the columns 2-7 do not improve VAR predictions of the variables in the rst column. As notation we
denote by Ret to mean returns and V olat to mean volatility.
Ret bonds Ret stocks Volat bonds Volat stocks Spread bonds Spread stocks
Ret bonds 0.0063 0.7785 0.0203 0.5217 2.5533 0.1521
(0.9368) (0.3776) (0.8868) (0.4701) (0.1101) (0.6966)
Ret stocks 0.5059 0.6284 0.0168 0.3339 2.7236 0.9867
(0.4769) (0.4279) (0.8968) (0.5634) (0.0989) (0.3205)
Volat bonds 4.9904 7.2477 7.7957 3.6099 5.7808 5.7561
(0.0255) (0.0071) (0.0052) (0.0574) (0.0162) (0.0164)
Volat stocks 6.6450 2.5229 5.0283 3.8902 2.0731 2.2238
(0.0099) (0.1122) (0.0249) (0.0486) (0.1499) (0.1359)
Spread bonds 0.8384 1.5858 1.7703 1.1497 1.5474 1.4936
(0.3599) (0.2079) (0.1833) (0.2836) (0.2135) (0.2217)
Spread stocks 0.0586 4.0738 0.0006 1.4393 3.3728 0.3871
(0.8087) (0.0436) (0.9806) (0.2303) (0.0663) (0.5338)
41Table 6: This table shows forecast error variance decomposition obtained for the variables in the VAR
estimated for the sample of 900 nancial rms for which short sell ban was imposed on September
18th 2008. VAR is estimated with one lag. The data cover the period from September 1st 2008 till
September 30th 2008. Entry (i;j) of each panel shows the part of the variance of the i-th forecast
variable (in the row) attributed to the j-th component of the shock (associated with the variable in
the column). As notation we denote by Ret to mean returns and V olat to mean volatility.
Ret bonds Ret stocks Volat bonds Volat stocks Spread bonds Spread stocks
Forecast horizon 1
Ret bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ret stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Volat bonds 0.0005 0.0001 6.1621 0.4433 0.0402 0.0002
Volat stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.4433 0.0319 0.0029 0.0000
Spread bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0402 0.0029 0.0003 0.0005
Spread stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000
Forecast horizon 3
Ret bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ret stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Volat bonds 0.0005 0.0004 5.8370 0.3658 0.0169 0.0001
Volat stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.3658 0.0229 0.0011 0.0000
Spread bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0169 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000
Spread stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Forecast horizon 6
Ret bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ret stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Volat bonds 0.0004 0.0001 5.9890 0.0422 0.0160 0.0000
Volat stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0422 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000
Spread bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Spread stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Forecast horizon 9
Ret bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ret stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Volat bonds 0.0003 0.0001 6.1552 0.4730 0.0056 0.0004
Volat stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.4730 0.0364 0.0004 0.0000
Spread bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
Spread stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Forecast horizon 12
Ret bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ret stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Volat bonds 0.0004 0.0003 5.7486 0.5309 0.0284 0.0003
Volat stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.5309 0.0490 0.0026 0.0000
Spread bonds 0.0000 0.0000 0.0284 0.0026 0.0001 0.0000
Spread stocks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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